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SPECTRES OF LAW & ECONOMICS
William H. Widen*
THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS, THE EROTICS OF THE MARKET. By Jeanne
Lorraine Schroeder. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2004. Pp.
318. $80.
INTRODUCTION
"Did you know that the first Matrix was designed to be a perfect human
world? Where none suffered, where everyone would be happy? It was a
disaster."1
There are spectres haunting law and economics - the spectres of
G.W.F. Hegel2 and Jacques Lacan.3 This is one of the central theses of
Professor Jeanne L. Schroeder's challenging new book: The Triumph
of Venus, The Erotics of the Market ("Triumph of Venus").' Schroeder
uses insights inspired by the teachings of Hegel and the French
psychoanalyst, Lacan, to critique some basic assumptions made by
scholars who use economic ideas to investigate the law and legal
institutions - the law and economics ("L&E") practitioners. The
book devotes much space to criticism of Judge Posner's vision of law,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, Coral Gables,
Florida, wwiden@law.miami.edu; A.B. 1980, Stanford; J.D. 1983, Harvard. Professor Widen
practiced corporate and commercial law from 1984 to 2001 at Cravath, Swaine & Moore in
New York City (since 1991 as a member of the Firm). -Ed. I am grateful for my
conversations with Reza Dibadj, Patrick Gudridge, Arthur Jacobson, George Triantis,
William Maker, and Robert Wallace about this project.
1. THE MATRIX (Warner Studios 1999).
2. Hegel is best known for the caricature of his triadic logical method - proceeding by
search for a thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Hegel's writing style is complex and obscure,
particularly his treatises on logic. Fortunately, Hegel's more accessible political treatise,
Philosophy of Right, figures prominently in Professor Schroeder's analysis. See G. W. F.
HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (H. B. Nisbet trans., Allen W. Wood
ed., 2003) [hereinafter, HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT].
3. Lacan is known for advocating a return to the teaching of Sigmund Freud. As with
Hegel, the writing style is complex and obscure. A reading of Hegel significantly influenced
some of Lacan's theories. Interestingly, it appears that Lacan did not study the Philosophy of
Right but instead Alexandre Kojeve's anthropological reading of the more complex
Phenomenology of Spirit. See ANTHONY ELLIOTr, SOCIAL THEORY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS
IN TRANSITION 112 (1999).




using it as a proxy for L&E scholarship generally.' Professor
Schroeder succinctly states her basic problem with L&E:
In recent years, the study of markets in American jurisprudence has been
expropriated by the self-styled "law-and-economics" movement, the
dominant discourse of private law in America's most elite law schools.
One of its appeals is that it gives an aura of scientific certainty and
objectivity to legal analysis and normative policymaking. Despite its
claim to scientific status, however, this scholarship is almost entirely
devoid of methodological discussion and internal criticism, as though
these matters were uncontroversial. (pp. 1-2)
In Schroeder's view, L&E fails to engage in meaningful empirical
research. Instead, its members spin out analyses and policy
recommendations like armchair pundits, giving advice based on non-
falsifiable conclusions deduced from unexamined premises. The L&E
movement is a "degenerating research program."6 As such, it spends
more time protecting its theoretical core than discovering facts about
the world. Notwithstanding these deficiencies, L&E has thrived due to
an ineffective response from the critical left perspective. Schroeder
finds inadequate critiques of L&E grounded in a form of romanticism
suffering from flaws similar to those afflicting the utilitarian
underpinnings of L&E itself - both view markets and market
transactions as spheres of cold rationality (p. 2).
Much L&E scholarship relies on the concepts of "perfect market"
and "wealth maximization" to develop models designed to explain
aspects of the law and legal institutions. Schroeder's project is to
expose inconsistencies in these concepts that make them ill-suited
both for descriptive and normative roles in these models. Moreover,
the goal of "wealth maximization" is revealed as inconsistent with
basic notions of property. Schroeder finds the defects in these
concepts particularly troubling because their use may inhibit human
freedom. For Hegelians, promotion of human freedom is the
highest aim.
From the foregoing, however, one should not get the idea that
Schroeder's program amounts either to a tirade against market
economies or a call to embrace a leftist political agenda. In fact, she
makes clear that her analysis actually sees markets as performing a
5. Judge Posner authored the leading text on law and economics. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2002). Recently, Professor Steven Shavell
has published a competing textbook on law and economics. See STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004). Though it is beyond the scope of
this essay to consider in detail whether Professor Shavell's approach differs sufficiently from
Judge Posner's to avoid Professor Schroeder's critique, I indicate below Shavell's awareness
of conceptual difficulties with wealth maximization and the ideal of the perfect market that
Schroeder criticizes mainstream L&E for ignoring.
6. P. 3. Professor Schroeder borrows the phrase "degenerating research program" from
Imre Lakatos, the philosopher of science, and expressly uses it in his sense.
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central role in the development of legal subjects (p. 143). Nor does
Schroeder believe that an appeal to Lacan or Hegel licenses specific or
detailed policy recommendations (pp. 4-5, 10). Accordingly, her
agenda risks being accused of shortcomings ascribed to the critical
legal-studies movement - particularly the charge that no alternative
normative agenda emerges from the analysis.'
This criticism may be deflected, at least partially, by Schroeder's
identification of the L&E discourse as the "discourse of the
university" in Lacanian parlance.8 University discourse claims to have
scientific answers to policy questions when, in fact, this appeal to
objectivity masks an ideological agenda, typically to preserve an
existing allocation of power. For Schroeder, unless L&E is recognized
in its true nature, it risks stifling important policy and political debate
behind the veil of science. In this sense, the L&E discourse is anti-
freedom. Thus, one positive consequence of Schroeder's agenda might
be promotion of more vigorous public debate over important
economic issues on ethical grounds where now those issues might be
taken as settled by economic-policy science.9
By exposing the true underpinnings of L&E, Schroeder hopes that
L&E practitioners will make more modest claims and return to the
original teachings of Ronald Coase by shifting their focus to empirical
research of actual markets.
What we can do, as Coase pleads, is to study actual costs and actual
behavior in actual markets on their own terms. Although we can retain
the impossible ideal of the perfect market, we must set realistic goals
based on contingent, empirical judgments as to the relative efficiency of
possible actual market choices. (p. 148)
Many professional economists already recognize the limitations
inherent in neoclassical modeling of markets and human behavior and
they are working to improve economic analysis in light of these
7. See, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17
LAW & SOC. INOUIRY 779 (1992).
8. P. 5. Professor Schroeder provides an extensive analysis of this observation in Jeanne
L. Schroeder, The Four Discourses of Law: A Lacanian Analysis of Legal Practice and
Scholarship, 79 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2000); see also PAUL VERHAEGHE, DOES THE WOMAN
EXIST? (Marc du Ry trans., rev. ed. 1999) (providing a book-length analysis of the Lacanian
discourses).
9. I take Schroeder's rejection of economic policy science as having two grounds. It
stems from a rejection of pure utilitarian ethics (i.e., ethics that exclude basic notions of
justice and fairness) and from the technical observation that, even if our ethical intuitions
were captured by notions of utility maximization, we are rarely if ever in a position to
competently perform the required calculation. I do not mean to suggest that economic-
policy science is divorced from ethics. See generally JOHN BROOME, ETHICS OUT OF
ECONOMICS (1999). When pursuit of a policy is advocated because it is the "most efficient,"
opponents are left to advocate for the inefficient result, placing them at a rhetorical
disadvantage unless they are prepared to challenge the claim of efficiency. The claim of
efficiency typically is asserted as an empirical fact, thus not subject to challenge.
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perceived shortcomings.' ° Though Professor Schroeder's project may
be of interest to these economists, her work is targeted at those using
economics in the legal academy that have not yet awakened to the
deficiencies of the brand of economics used by L&E.'1
Triumph of Venus is structured in five chapters, interlaced with
references to Greek mythology that illustrate aspects of Schroeder's
arguments."2 The first chapter explores theories on the nature of gift
transactions (using Pandora) as a prelude to her second-chapter
critique of the concept of the perfect market (using Orpheus). The
third chapter analyzes the property theories of Calabresi and
Melamed"3 (using Narcissus) as preamble to Chapter Four, which
analyzes the deficiencies of the concept of wealth maximization (using
10. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: A Perspective on
Intuitive Judgment and Choice, Nobel Prize Lecture (December 8, 2002), available at
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2002/kahnemann-lecture.pdf; see also BRUNO S.
FREY & MATTHIAS BENZ, FROM IMPERIALISM TO INSPIRATION: A SURVEY OF ECONOMICS
AND PSYCHOLOGY (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 118, 2002)
(discussing bounded rationality, non-selfish behavior, and the economics of happiness);
George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and Identity, 115 Q.J. ECON. 715
(2000) (exploring how to incorporate psychological and sociological concepts into economic
models of behavior); Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM.
ECON. REV. 359 (1994) (criticizing neoclassical economics for modeling a frictionless and
static world that fails to explain economic performance over time). Further, some reflection
on method is occurring in the legal academy. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Foreword,
Revisiting Gibson and Kraakman's Efficiency Story, 28 J. CORP. L. 499 (2003). And, some
other legal academics are, like Professor Schroeder, beginning to look for alternate
approaches to L&E. See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Beyond Facile Assumptions and Radical
Assertions: A Case for "Critical Legal Economics," 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1155 (2003); Devon
W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J.
1757 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY
(Francisco Valdes et al., eds., 2002)).
11. Professor Schroeder's concerns are not limited to the use of neoclassical price theory
but extend to the L&E movement's misuse of new work being performed by behavioral
economists. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Stumbling Block: Freedom, Rationality, and Legal
Scholarship, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 267-69 (2002). Indeed, she finds the use of
behavioral economics by legal academics potentially more destructive of freedom than
traditional L&E. Acceptance of behavioral economics might lead to laws discouraging
activity that, though not harmful, is considered irrational. See also Donald Cooper,
Commentary: Misbehavioral Economics, NAVIGATOR, May 2001,
http://www.ios.org/text/dcooper-misbehavioral-economics.asp?navigator.
12. From an analytic-philosophy perspective, the use of myth goes hand in glove with
the use of psychoanalysis. For example, Ludwig Wittgenstein considered psychoanalysis
itself to be a form of myth. See JACQUES BOUVERESSE, WITTGENSTEIN READS FREUD
(Carol Cosman trans., 1995). In his view, psychoanalysis could not be a science because not
all mental events have causes. But, Wittgenstein did not apply the label "myth" in a negative
sense. He found value in persuasive discourse. Indeed, a psychoanalytic cure may result from
the analyst and patient mutually accepting a narrative that has no actual basis in the history
of the individual. Verbalization in the form of narrative acceptance acts to dissolve the ill
effects of the symptom. The danger identified by Wittgenstein consists of confusing
psychoanalysis with science.
13. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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Midas). Chapter Five locates the origins of law in desire rather than in
rationality (using The Eumenides) and expresses the hope that society
may develop social structures better suited to promote human
development. Each chapter consists largely of reworked material from
prior law review articles. Thus, Triumph of Venus might be seen as a
collection of essays. Beyond the overarching theme of exploring
economic rationality from a Hegelian and Lacanian perspective, a
common thread links the various topics: Schroeder's desire to show
how policy recommendations based on unsound conceptual analysis
conflict with the exercise of human freedom.
Part I of this Review explains Schroeder's analysis of the
shortcomings and paradoxes associated with the concept of "perfect
market." Part II does the same for the concept of "wealth
maximization." Part III shows how integration of these two concepts
into a theory of human action can be seen as destructive of human
freedom. Part IV provides an account of the construction of social
facts to show how persons, exercising freedom, may improve the social
structure. Part V discusses policy suggestions based on economic
reasoning to illustrate how Schroeder's ideas might apply in practice.
My method is to explain Schroeder's arguments by framing them,
where possible, in terms of analytic philosophy.14
I. THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS WITH PERFECT MARKETS
Professor Schroeder explains the central role of the concept of the
perfect market in the formation of policy recommendations:
According to legal economists, efficiency would be achieved if the ideal
of the perfect market were implemented. We should, therefore, modify
our legal and political institutions so as to make the actual markets as
nearly perfect as we can or, if that is impossible, to replicate the results of
the perfect market as closely as possible.15
Schroeder's critique of the "perfect market" takes two forms. First,
she gives a general analysis of the perfect-market concept. Second, she
critiques that concept from a Hegelian/Lacanian perspective.
14. Professor Schroeder specifically states that certain of her arguments are designed to
stand apart from the theories of Hegel and Lacan. I highlight these independent aspects in
my discussion. Indeed, for many readers, the use of Hegel and Lacan may be an impediment
to understanding. In my reading, however, I detect strains of more accessible analytic
philosophy in the chosen references to Hegel and Lacan and draw upon these sources to
highlight what I see at stake in her analysis.
15. P. 107. A recent textbook on L&E avoids even reference to the ideal of the perfect
market in its subject index. See SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 736. Instead, Shavell refers to the
invariance version of the Coase theorem, noting that it "needs to be carefully interpreted,
and is not necessarily a good guide for thinking, even when bargaining is apparently
frictionless." Id. at 106. The invariance version of the Coase theorem notes that, regardless
of the initial allocation of property rights, parties will reallocate resources in a manner that
maximizes social welfare if we assume the absence of bargaining costs. Id. at 102.
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According to this first critique, "Once the perfect market is achieved,
all markets stop. Once again, this was one of Coase's points. Markets
only exist as a means of eliminating transaction costs. When
0 transaction costs are eliminated, markets are also necessarily
eliminated."16
In essence, Schroeder's first critique argues that the perfect-market
concept is oxymoronic - that conjoining the terms "perfect" and
"market" is like conjoining the terms "round" and "square."' 7 I
understand her observation by conceiving of a market as a structure 8
pursuant to which individuals may execute multiple bilateral contracts
in a more efficient manner than would be possible in the absence of
the structure. 19 Just as a firm is a structure to reduce transaction costs,
so too is a market. The firm reduces transaction costs by replacing
bilateral contracting costs with the management structure of the firm.
The market, rather than replacing bilateral contracting with an
alternate structure, reduces transaction costs by lowering the costs of
individual bilateral contracting activity. A perfect market, however, is
characterized by the absence of transaction costs. Both firms and
markets exist to reduce transaction costs, but without transaction costs
there would be neither firms nor markets, as their raison d'etre has
ceased. Thus, the aspirational goal of attaining the perfect market is a
wish for the end of all markets.'0
16. P. 143. The dynamic of the perfect market thus resembles the dynamic of desire.
Complete satisfaction of desire is fatal to the subject.
17. Noam Chomsky's famous sentence: "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously"
illustrates the point. See NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX 149
(1965). Though syntactically well formed, the sentence is semantic nonsense. To ask "Do
colorless green ideas sleep furiously?" is to ask a meaningless question. Similarly, to ask
questions about a "perfect market" may well be to ask meaningless questions.
18. For a simple case of market as structure, think of a village market in which persons
periodically meet in a single location, bringing goods to trade. By coming together in a single
market "place," at an agreed date and time, bilateral contracting costs are reduced because
individuals need make only one round trip to the market and home again. The structure
consists of the agreed meeting day, time, and location. This notion of an efficient structure
reflects the notion in graph theory that the method using the least edges to connect multiple
points in a connected graph is to designate a single point as the "center" and then connect all
other points to that single point using edges. See, e.g., GARY CHARTRAND, INTRODUCTORY
GRAPH THEORY (1977). Such a structure need not be limited to facilitating simple
exchanges. In such a structure, parties may give representations and warranties relating to
objects exchanged and also may contract for goods to be delivered at future market
meetings.
19. Conceived of as a structure, the market is distinguished from the actual exchange or
contract itself. This conception of the market differs from those advanced by some critical
legal theorists who equate the institution of contract with the market itself. See Roberto
Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563,625 (1982)
(equating the institution of contract with the market itself).
20. Professor Schroeder originally developed this critique in Jeanne L. Schroeder, The
End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics, 112 HARv. L. REV. 483 (1998)
[hereinafter, Schroeder, End of Market].
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This first critique suggests another odd conceptual feature. Though
it is not uncommon to construct scientific models based on
assumptions that are impossible to achieve in practice - such as
assuming a perfect vacuum or a frictionless surface in the study of
motion - such assumptions, if realized, would not eliminate the
activity under study. In contrast, the existence of a perfect market is
an assumption that, if realized, would result in the end of market
activity.2' Thus, for Schroeder, the perfect market is not merely
empirically impossible, it is theoretically impossible. L&E's
shortcoming is its failure to consider the implications of using a
theoretically impossible ideal.22
Professor Schroeder's second critique follows from these first
observations. Conceptually, the perfect market is an imaginary zone in
which exchange of property objects between individual persons ceases.
For a follower of Hegel or Lacan, however, the ongoing exchange of
objects between persons functions as an essential component in the
formation of human personality or subjectivity in a modem society. 3
The abstract person, as such, has no independent individuation criteria
that allow its identification as a single thing.24 In an attempt to
distinguish itself, the abstract person infuses its particular will in
objects by "acquiring" or "possessing" them, thereby asserting, in
effect, "I am the thing that possesses these objects." Such a stance,
however, makes the subject a slave to those objects. The abstract
person only achieves a free existence when, in a free exchange of
objects with another abstract person, each person recognizes the other
as an individual will via recognition of the other's rights in the object
subject to exchange. Thus, the formation of individual identity
requires recognition by another, which derives from the free
contractual exchange of things. Lacan provides a similar analysis of
exchange as essential to mental development. 25 Further, for Lacan the
21. Id. at 517.
22. Id. at 516.
23. See David Gray Carlson, How To Do Things With Hegel, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1377,
1378-79 (2000) (explaining how, for Hegel, contract and exchange are essential for human
subjectivity, not merely convenient). In this sense, the institution of property is essential in
the formation of personality. Others have suggested that the institution of property may be
essential for other reasons, such as solving the problem of "the commons." See, e.g., Michael
A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets, 111 HARv. L. REV. 621 (1998) (discussing the problem of the commons and
offering a symmetrical problem of the anticommons).
24. Individuation criteria consist of distinguishing characteristics that, among other
things, allow us to identify and count particular things. The abstract person conceived of as
merely an absolutely free will has no such characteristics. JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE
VESTAL AND THE FASCES 27 (1998).
25. As one commentator explains Lacan, "The ego owes its identity to the other; in
order to be or become someone, I have to identify with something that comes from without,
and thus with something I myself am not and have not brought about." PHILIPPE VAN
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existence of the unconscious is a central fact of human subjectivity.
The perfect-market assumption of complete information requires that
persons know their own minds, but such knowledge would result in
the destruction of personality (p. 131). Thus, to advocate a goal that
eliminates ongoing exchange and transaction costs is to implicitly
lobby for the elimination of human personality or subjectivity.
Both of Schroeder's critiques indicate a conceptual inconsistency
between the use of the perfect market as a goal and freedom. Our
practical inability, though, to eradicate core transaction costs, such as
time, space, and incomplete information, means that we will never
face the death of the market by realizing its ideal, perfect form. Even
if the perfect market is "perfectly un-free" (p. 142), something more is
needed to show the incompatibility between the L&E project and
actual freedom.26 Professor Schroeder often speaks in ways that imply
this something else might be a brand of determinism that follows from
L&E's modeling activity.27 That path, if taken, however, leads to
trouble. To make the anti-freedom pitch along traditional
deterministic lines would require Schroeder to take on the arguments
of a host of philosophers who have argued for the doctrine of
"compatibilism" - the notion that it is consistent to believe
simultaneously in a materialistic world governed by causation and in
free will.'
HAUTE, AGAINST ADAPTATION: LACAN'S "SUBVERSION" OF THE SUBJECT 86 (Paul Crow
& Miranda Vankerk trans., 2002).
26. Though her critique of the perfect market does not demonstrate that L&E is anti-
freedom in a strong sense, her analysis does show how purported descriptions of what would
happen if transaction costs were eliminated are incoherent. P. 148; cf. infra note 36 (noting
Shavell's observation about wealth maximization).
27. See, e.g., p. 311 ("If the future was perfectly determinate and predictable, we would
not be free - we would be totally masculine, with no room for.the feminine."). This notion
implicitly requires adoption of a compositionality thesis to the effect that large-scale
economic phenomena must be explained as a composite of behavior of individuals who
exhibit the particular traits assumed by the model. Not all economists would accept such a
restriction; some argue that large-scale economic phenomena can be modeled as if the
individuals each operated in accord with particular traits exhibited by homo economicus.
Such economists would not be encompassed by charges of determinism.
28. See. e.g., DANIEL C. DENNETr, FREEDOM EVOLVES (2003); ROBERT NozICK,
Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice, in SOCRATIC PUZZLES 45 (1997);
DONALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS (1980). Nozick's discussion of
Newcomb's problem appeared in a somewhat different form in the Scientific American
Magazine in 1973 and sparked a huge reader response. See ROBERT NOZICK, Reflections on
Newcomb's Problem, in SOCRATIC PUZZLES 74 (1997). Some have argued that the great
Hegel himself was a compatibilist of sorts. See Robert B. Pippin, Naturalness and
Mindedness: Hegel's Compatibilism, 7 EUR. J. PHIL. 194 (1999). I do not mean to imply that
such an argument cannot be made. I merely suggest that if she wishes to take that road,
Professor Schroeder has a formidable task in front of her, including possible reconciliation
with Hegelian teaching. For Alexandre Kojeve, Hegal envisioned two worlds: the
determined, given world of nature and the historical or human world. Human freedom does
not consist of a choice between two "givens" in the natural world but instead is the negation
of a given through action by an individual person. ALEXANDRE KoJivE, INTRODUCTION TO
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Reference to Hegel presents a possible way forward because Hegel
provides a third objection to use of the perfect market as a goal for the
political process. For Hegel, there are three spheres of human activity
in which ethical life or Sittlichkeit might be realized: (i) the family, (ii)
contract or market relationships (also referred to as "civil society"),
and (iii) the modem state.29 The structure of family life (in which
individuals pursue common projects), as well as the structure of
contract or market relations (in which individuals pursue private
interests), are to be preserved, yet subordinated to the structure of the
state (in which the overarching common project is the promotion of
freedom for individuals). Though both are important aspects of
human existence (and reflect aspects of the state), both the spheres of
family life and the market are incomplete. They do not have the
collective goal of promoting freedom and thus are inadequate to
promote fully the development of human potential. From the
Hegelian viewpoint, a state that concentrated solely on promoting
efficient preference satisfaction in the sphere of market activity would
be stuck in second gear. Such a state would fail to adopt its proper role
of promoting human flourishing and, ultimately, freedom.3° For Hegel,
extreme poverty and extreme wealth raises serious challenges for
modem society because both tend to destroy a collective allegiance to
promotion of freedom. Hegel, however, did not purport to have an
answer to the problem of poverty, though he tentatively suggested
expansion of markets abroad to address poverty in Prussia as a partial
solution. From this standpoint, the L&E movement appears to be anti-
freedom, because it advocates policies that merely promote
satisfaction of market desires.3'
Pursuit of the Hegelian critique based on the proper role of the
state, however, must be further developed if it is to have real impact.
L&E practitioners would, I suspect, claim that efforts to improve
THE READING OF HEGEL 216, 222 (James H. Nichols, Jr. trans., 1980). Such a vision
provides one basis for constructing a doctrine of compatibalism. Without more, the fact that
economists construct models designed to predict human behavior does not allow the easy
inference of a conflict with promotion of human freedom.
29. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 2. Professor Schroeder does not
develop this third Hegelian point, presumably because she wishes to avoid policy
recommendations and, ultimately, politics. For details on how the argument might be
elaborated, see Michel Rosenfeld, Hegel and the Dialectics of Contract, in HEGEL AND
LEGAL THEORY 228 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1991).
30. Terry Pinkard, Hegel's biographer, writes:
Whereas civil society is the sphere of free individuals, political life has for its purpose the
establishment of the conditions necessary for a free people. For this goal to be actualized, the
state must be articulated into a set of appropriately modem governmental institutions, whose
legitimating principle is again that of freedom, not efficiency or preference satisfaction.
TERRY PINKARD, HEGEL: A BIOGRAPHY 486 (2000) (commenting on Philosophy of Right).
31. Though Hegel had read Adam Smith, he did not pursue the notion that unfettered
markets might best achieve freedom for individuals.
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market efficiency by reducing transaction costs are strongly pro-
freedom because they facilitate the making of more exchanges by
individuals with limited resources. As discussed above, even
Schroeder states that such exchanges are a mechanism that individuals
use to express their freedom. To effectively counter this type of L&E
defense, one must provide an account of what further actions the state
should be taking to promote freedom. In effect, Hegel's defense of the
organization of the Prussian state must be updated for modern times.
In part, such an approach would require an explanation of the
governmental structures that allow individuals to see their own
freedom reflected in the law and not merely an argument that
extremes of wealth and poverty inhibit the development of this
collective vision.32 Professor Schroeder, however, would like to avoid
such political judgments.
Though, in its present form, Professor Schroeder's analysis of the
perfect market does not, in itself, demonstrate L&E's incompatibility
with freedom, it does provide a psychoanalytic account that explains
how the perfect-market concept has had such staying power in
theoretical analysis.
The alternate strategy for masculine economics is to compromise its
desire and thereby substitute drive for desire - and, as Lacan famously
asserted, all drives are death drives .... [T]his is the road taken by
Posner, who seeks to avoid the unsatisfied eroticism of actual markets
characterized by desire through the creation of a jurisprudence based on
a hypothetical market characterized by the deathly drive of wealth
maximization. (p. 140-41)
The perfect market is the means toward maximizing preference
satisfaction. To evaluate the success or failure of the perfect market as
a means to that end, we need a measuring rod for the preferences that
32. Two illustrations of proposals for structural change come to mind. A recent
structural suggestion for a "Deliberation Day" comes from Bruce Ackerman and James
Fishkin. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004).
Deliberation Day is a proposal for a federally sponsored holiday in which individuals would
be paid to consider candidates and issues prior to an election. Judge Posner has criticized the
proposal. See Richard Posner, Smooth Sailing, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 41. Another
approach consistent with Hegel's admiration for Greek culture might be to explore
application of Aristotelian concepts linking human flourishing to inquiries in biology. For
Aristotle, it was an easy matter to examine a plant or animal and determine whether or not it
was thriving in its particular condition. Similarly, we might look at our current consumer
society driven by apparently ever-improving market conditions and find that individuals, in
fact, are not thriving. To proceed, such an approach would require development of some
measure of human flourishing. Such measurements might be found in the measurements of
those engaged in comparative studies of legal systems. This, at least, might motivate the
search for further conditions that might be pursued by the State. Such an approach would be
consistent with attempts to identify those characteristics of a system that are associated with
economic development, eradication of disease, elimination of hunger, reduction in child
mortality rates, etc. through ongoing comparative studies of legal systems. Charles Taylor,
Hegel's Ambiguous Legacy for Modern Liberalism, in HEGEL AND LEGAL THEORY, supra
note 29, at 64 (describing Hegel as a "civic humanist").
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we would maximize. That measure is, in general, utility, and its more
specific surrogate, wealth.
II. THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS WITH WEALTH MAXIMIZATION
As Professor Schroeder has elaborated elsewhere,33 the essential
elements of property consist of the exclusive right of one legal person
to (i) possess, (ii) transfer, and (iii) consume (or enjoy) a property
object. This conception of property goes back at least to Roman times.
When society recognizes these three rights in a particular legal person
with respect to an object, the person is said to have a "property" in the
object. The core problem with L&E's employment of the concept of
wealth maximization is that, though the principle of wealth
maximization recognizes possession and transfer as components of
property, it ignores the roles of consumption and enjoyment. Professor
Schroeder sets up this point in Chapter Three by her critique of
Calabresi and Melamed's analysis of property law; through six
scenarios she illustrates how the component of enjoyment is absent
from their theory, thus allowing for only partial explanation of the
institution of property. The repression of enjoyment developed in
Chapter Three is the foundation for Chapter Four's critique of the
wealth-maximization principle because consumption results in a
reduction of wealth and, as a logical matter, the true wealth maximizer
would forever delay consumption or enjoyment. This observation is
expected by Professor Schroeder to surprise people but I do not think
it is subject to simple fix via definitions. Wealth maximization and
consumption simply are incommensurate.
In Posner's imaginary system, market participants do not engage in
market transactions in order to obtain objects to be enjoyed, because no
objects are ever enjoyed in his system. Rather, they engage in market
transactions for the purpose of engaging in market transactions - i.e.,
they exchange one object in order to achieve its exchange value to
acquire another object which, in turn, is exchanged in order to achieve its
exchange value, ad infinitum (p. 269).
Professor Schroeder uses the Midas myth to reinforce her point. In
today's society, we use the term "Midas touch" as a term of praise or
approval to refer to someone with a knack for making money. But, in
the original myth, the "golden touch" prevented King Midas from
eating - it was a curse not a beneficial attribute. Yet, this inversion of
the myth's original meaning suggests how current ideology adopts
wealth maximization as a desirable goal. In fact, as the myth teaches,
emphasis on wealth maximization can be harmful rather than helpful
as an end, particularly when it is the sole or primary end.
33. See SCHROEDER, supra note 24, at 37.
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Professor Schroeder additionally notes the lack of precision
associated with the concept of "utility" maximization and explains
how Judge Posner hoped that the substitution of the more easily
measured "wealth" maximization would provide greater certainty. On
closer examination, however, she finds that the substitution does not
promote certainty unless wealth is limited to a simple measurement of
money or money's worth. 4
Happiness (or a broad notion of utility and well-being) is
notoriously difficult to measure, and any attempt to measure
happiness by using a proxy such as wealth creates a distortion. The
measurement heuristic destroys the very thing being measured.
Wealth may be a means to achieve the end of happiness as well-being
- wealth is something that enables individuals to enjoy life. But, when
wealth is substituted for happiness as the measure, the logic of wealth
maximization (as opposed to happiness or well-being maximization)
requires the absence of enjoyment altogether. To maximize wealth is
to enjoy nothing - the very opposite of happiness or well-being.
Professor Schroeder sees the pure wealth maximizer as a miser who
never spends or consumes.
To be fair, however, the image of the L&E practitioner
unreflectively advocating wealth maximization has become a bit of a
caricature. Though Judge Posner advocated use of wealth
maximization at one time, his more recent work attempts to
incorporate other factors in the analysis.35 And, the newest L&E
textbook expressly acknowledges that the concept of wealth
maximization is incoherent, though Professor Shavell believes that
careful use of the concept may nevertheless provide some insights.36
Caricature or not, in Schroeder's analysis we find that both the
object being maximized - wealth - and the means used to maximize
34. Elsewhere, Schroeder notes that the concepts of wealth and utility maximization are
sufficiently close as to be interchangeable for purposes of her critique. See SCHROEDER,
supra note 24, at 16.
35. Compare Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979) (advocating wealth maximization), with RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999) (advocating a pragmatic
approach considering multiple factors).
36. Professor Shavell writes:
What, however, can be said of the notion of "wealth maximization," a social goal advanced
by many scholars who have analyzed legal rules in an economically oriented manner? As I
will now explain, (a) the goal of wealth maximization is not one employed in welfare
economics - indeed, it is not a well-defined goal, that is, it is theoretically incoherent -
even though the impression in legal academic circles is that wealth maximization is the
general normative goal endorsed by economists; (b) the goal of wealth maximization has
been criticized by legal academics for reasons that are, ironically, largely consistent with
welfare economics ....
SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 667-68. As a matter of terminology, from a pragmatic standpoint
a concept that has utility is not, strictly speaking, meaningless.
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it - the perfect market - conceptually display self-destructive
tendencies: exchange, subjectivity, and enjoyment all cease when the
logic of these two concepts is ruthlessly pursued in any model. The use
of these concepts to guide policy can promote social structures that
hinder freedom. To see how this is so, Schroeder employs a theory of
human action.
III. A HUMAN-ACTION MODEL
From Professor Schroeder's Hegelian/Lacanian perspective, the
market economy is erotic in the technical sense that the desires of
individual actors drive market exchange.37 Individuals experience
desire as a "lack" - the lack of some lost object that, once regained,
will make them whole and satisfy their desires. They pursue
acquisition of objects through exchange transactions to cure this lack.
The object cause of desire that each individual pursues, however -
the object a in Lacanian parlance - does not ever truly inhere in the
particular objects acquired. Thus, particular object acquisition never
satisfies desire. Desires are unstable - the opposite of a type of
phenomena susceptible to easy modeling. The notion that policy might
be directed toward satisfaction of desires appears hopeless. How
might any policymaker discern just which desires to maximize?
Professor Schroeder's analysis becomes clear against the outline of
a theory of human action based on the work of analytic philosophers.
Below, I sketch an outline of one such theory of human action using
the concepts of information,38 beliefs,39 desires, preferences, and
action.4 The outline will show how, in a more familiar theoretical
framework, desires display the same type of inconstancy as that
theorized by Lacan, thus reflecting the challenges facing any modeling
enterprise.
37. Schroeder, End of Market, supra note 20, at 492. The root desire that underpins all
the particular desires that economists believe are satisfied in markets is the passionate desire
for recognition. For Hegel, this desire originates with a person's love for other persons and is
stronger than particular desires for food or shelter. See Arthur J. Jacobson, Hegel's Legal
Plenum, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 877, 895-900 (1989). According to Hegel, market exchange is
the only mechanism suited to achieve this recognition. Id.
38. Information consists of the sense data received from ordinary experience.
39. Individuals form beliefs based on information. Beliefs may consist of simple
propositions, such as "The cat is on the mat," or law-like conditionals, such as "If I drop this
ball, then it will fall to the ground."
40. This model derives primarily from my reading of Donald Davidson. See DONALD
DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS (2d ed. 2001). The model also borrows from
Jon Elster, particularly JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF
RATIONALITY (1983), and Kenneth Arrow, Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences
(Cowles Comm'n Paper No. 48, 1951), reprinted in THE POLICY SCIENCES 129 (Daniel
Lerner & Harold D. Lasswell eds., 1951). It is substantially similar to models of the rational
homo economicus used by economists.
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An individual person acquires information about the world and
then forms beliefs based on this acquired information set. Separately,
the individual has a set of desires. (We can assume that these desires
vary in intensity and may be rank ordered based on this level of
intensity.) Based on the individual's belief set, the individual uses
means-ends reasoning to identify a subset of her desires that might be
satisfied by taking one or a series of actions (the "realizable set" of
desires). The individual then constructs a baseline rank ordering of
desires from this realizable set. The individual, however, then modifies
the baseline rank ordering by making adjustments for the perceived
costs in time, money, effort, reputation, and risk associated with
satisfaction of the desires in the realizable set. When adjusted for
these various costs, the baseline ordering of desires from the realizable
set may change, resulting in a second ordering which lists the actual
preferences held by actors. An individual takes action to satisfy the
desire that ranks first in the list of preferences at the end of this two-
stage ordering process. Thus, the individual's action is explained.
When the action results in satisfaction of the desire (or in failure),
the individual moves to the next item on the list and takes action to
satisfy that second desire (which now has moved to first on the list).4
In the meantime, however, the individual continues to acquire
information about the world that may modify the individual's set of
beliefs. This modification may, in turn, lead to a modification in the
adjusted rank ordering of preferences (either because the perceived
realizable set of desires changes, the individual's evaluation of the
costs associated with attaining these desires changes, or both).
Further, the desires of the individual may change (either by a change
in the set of the objects of desire, a change in the intensity of a desire,
or both) for reasons unrelated to the acquisition of new information.
41. In Lacanian terms, these desires do not consist of mere animal needs for basic life
requirements. Desire exceeds need. See VAN HAUTE, supra note 25, at 24, 104, 106. The
contemporary example of McDonald's restaurants illustrates how wide the gulf may be
between need and desire. The documentary Super Size Me recently won a directing award at
Sundance film festival for chronicling the deterioration in the health of filmmaker Morgan
Spurlock who ate nothing but McDonald's food for a month. See Brian Braeker, The Real
Price of a Big Mac, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 2004, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4078903/. Though
the McDonald's Corporation is changing its marketing emphasis toward healthier food
products and elimination of the "super size" option in response to lawsuits and adverse
publicity occasioned by the film, the phenomenon does indicate how an individual's desires
often conflict with basic needs.
42. Note that in this model, satisfaction of one desire does not lead to satisfaction in
general. The individual is never satisfied, but moves from item to item on the list. In this
sense, the individual is never complete or whole. In Lacanian terms, the individual is always
looking for the lost object of desire, which never is found. Instead the individual focuses on
particular objects, thinking that this particular object may be the one that satisfies. It never
does, except perhaps momentarily in what Lacan calls jouissance. Even jouissance, however,
as actually experienced by individual persons, is ephemeral and partial.
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Rationality in this model consists of means-ends reasoning with
certain formal properties.43 In contrast, we typically do not refer to an
individual's particular set of desires (or the levels of intensity of those
desires) as either rational or irrational. Instead, desires simply are
taken as given. Nevertheless, we may attempt to give a causal
explanation or a narrative to account for why an individual has a
particular desire. In this sense, some desires might be predetermined
whereas others might be the product of spontaneous free choice.
Given the forgoing, there is a surface tension that might lead one
to believe it difficult or impossible to maximize satisfaction of desires
in the market place. In a market setting, the possible objects of the
individual's desire (as consumer) are various goods and services.
Because the individual creates its ordered list of preferences by
adjusting for various costs, we might imagine increased demand for a
good when that good bears a lower price rather than a higher price.
Similarly, in a market setting, the possible objects of the individual's
desire (as producer) include wealth accumulation, so the individual
would tend to produce those goods and services that will most increase
her wealth. This would suggest production of goods and services that
can be exchanged for a high price, relative to cost of production.
Mathematical modeling, however, reveals that the contradiction
between the desires of consumers and producers is only apparent.
4
The empirical reason why some desires always will go unsatisfied is
scarcity. The market for production and exchange is characterized by
scarcity. Scarcity exists both in limitations on goods and services that
may be acquired and in limitations on the resources of individuals
available to trade in the market. Thus, the desires of the market
participants may not all be satisfied. The rank ordering of preferences,
however, results in satisfaction of individual desires through the
market in a manner that maximizes fulfillment of desire in light of this
scarcity."
43. For example, we assume that an individual can rank order any two preferences (or
express indifference) and, if A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then A is preferred
to C. All such notions of rationality, however, are purely instrumental and do not accord
with the Hegelian notion that relates rationality to free identification of ends by individual
persons.
44. Kenneth Arrow demonstrates how formalization usefully reconciles the apparent
contradiction between the verbal formalizations. If consumers seek to purchase products
with low prices while producers seek to provide products with high prices, it would appear
that the two groups work in opposite directions. This is not the case, however, as the
apparently inconsistent goals actually result in creation of equilibrium. See Arrow, supra
note 40.
45. In a few places, Professor Schroeder speaks as if realization of the perfect market
would result in the end of desire. See p. 143. This is not clearly so. If the perfect market
merely eliminates the subset of costs identified as "transaction costs" (i.e., the costs
associated with bargaining) then scarcity would still exist and some desires would go
unsatisfied, though all trading would cease because no individual would be able to improve
her position by further exchange. Only if the set of transaction costs is broadened to include
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There are several things to note about this model. First, it
hypothesizes a form of abstract desire46 uninfluenced by the world of
beliefs, costs (transaction and otherwise), and scarcity. In fact,
however, we only experience desire filtered through our systems of
belief and means-ends reasoning in a world of scarcity. Thus, our
initial ordering of desires is derivative.47 The presence of various costs
further biases our preference ordering. Thus, an actor may never
correctly identify his or her "true" preference ordering as it would
exist in the absence of transaction costs. As illustration, consider the
Dr. Seuss story about green eggs and ham in which a fantastical
creature spends the majority of the plot protesting to Sam-I-Am that
he "does not like green eggs and ham."'4 The protagonist suffers from
an information problem. When the creature finally tries the product, it
likes green eggs and ham and radically reorders its preferences,
placing green eggs and ham at the top of the list. We are left
wondering what preference ordering would result if the creature next
tried blue eggs and ham. Yet, our only source of information about the
creature's desires and preferences comes from statements made by the
creature and our observations of the creature's behavior. With
incomplete information, a consumer does not know her own mind (or,
at least, what her preference ordering would look like in the absence
of transaction costs) and neither do we.
Policy recommendations may be aimed at passing laws that affect
the status-quo preference ordering of actors either by eliminating
some costs or imposing others. As suggested by the model above,
all costs, including costs of production, would desire cease in a perfect market. Professor
Schroeder is well aware of this point but does not always indicate when she is speaking about
the narrower or broader definition of transaction costs. It is only the narrow definition of
transaction costs that holds any practical interest, the latter being a world in which "manna
falls from heaven" as Professor Schroeder quotes Professor Calabresi.
46. For illustrative purposes, we might tentatively identify this abstract, unfiltered desire
in the model with the psychoanalytic concept of "drive." For Lacan, all drives amount to
death drives. If this abstract unfiltered desire were to be satisfied in a moment of ultimate
Jouissance, as a conceptual matter the individual would cease to exist. To be an individual in
society is precisely to move between the poles of individual desires and their momentary, but
ultimately incomplete, satisfaction. See Nrstor A. Braunstein, Desire and Jouissance in the
Teachings of Lacan, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO LACAN 102 (Jean-Michel Rabat6
ed., 2003). It is from this perspective that Professor Schroeder critiques L&E's fascination
with the perfect market. If the perfect market were achieved, the market would end. Pursuit
of the L&E research agenda thus amounts to a strategy for dealing with drive.
47. We need to enter the world of belief and means-ends reasoning to make sense of the
concepts of scarcity and preference ordering. The notion that a useful concept of acontextual
preferences may not exist is not new to legal scholarship. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein,
Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217 (1993). If a preference
is a function of an initial entitlement allocated by law (such as illustrated by the so-called
"endowment effect"), then a policymaker is unable to identify a simple preference and the
best method to satisfy it. Id. This will be a problem whenever a preference is an artifact of
given positive laws.
48. DR. SEuss, GREEN EGGS AND HAM (1960).
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however, such actions merely reshuffle preferences as finally ordered
by the second preference ordering. It is not possible to say whether
any particular reshuffling will bring a group of actors closer to
maximizing satisfaction of their priority ordering of true, unfiltered
desires. Policy recommendations also may be aimed at altering belief
structures. Because an actor's structure of beliefs give rise to the first
base ordering of preferences we again find a reshuffling, but without
assurance that the change brings us any closer to maximization of
satisfaction of unfiltered desire. We observe that actual preference
orderings represent compromises - the problem of the second best. 9
We may not infer the identity of the first best or how to get there from
where we stand." Thus, policy recommendations framed in terms of
achieving the first best either are delusional or have another aim.5
One such aim might be to influence the nature of belief sets. One
direction that belief sets might be altered is in the direction of making
belief sets more uniform across individuals. For example, one might
attempt to foster the belief that wealth maximization should be the
goal of each actor. 2 To the extent manipulation of the belief set is
successful, it simplifies modeling and enhances prediction. We find
evidence of manipulation of the belief set in our popular culture
toward wealth maximization; examples include the inversion of the
Midas myth discussed above, the notion that "greed is good" from the
famous line in the Hollywood movie "Wall Street," and the adage "If
you are so smart, why aren't you rich?" Advertisements consist of
nothing but attempts to modify belief sets, by everything from
providing simple information to more active influence through
suggestion of counterfactual rules (e.g., if you owned this car, the
opposite sex would love you). The consumer society is fueled by the
notion that one should acquire ever fancier and more sophisticated
physical possessions. The consumer society "works" even if consumers
do not actually consume or enjoy the objects that they buy, so long as
consumers purchase.
From the foregoing, we can see how the L&E movement might fit
the Lacanian discourse of the university as proposed by Professor
Schroeder. 3 It can contribute to entrenchment of a particular ideology
49. P. 110; see R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24
REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).
50. P. 110; Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 49, at 11.
51. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Rationality in Law and Economics Scholarship, 79 OR. L.
REV. 147 (2000). Indeed, one of the central challenges facing policy recommendations based
on economic research is the problem of the second best. In light of this theory, economics
must explain how policy recommendations should be made.
52. Economists often make the simplifying assumption that persons act to maximize
wealth when modeling actors operating in commercial settings.
53. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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by maintaining or altering belief sets of actors in the direction of
predictable market behavior that facilitates modeling.
Though the human-action model outlined above does not purport
to suggest a cause for an actor's unfiltered set of desires, at the level of
a system of beliefs, the initial ordering of desires may be manipulated.
To the extent that the belief set includes normative judgments such as
"it is rational to maximize wealth and one ought to do what is
rational," then operative desires are manipulated. There is, of course,
nothing wrong in the abstract with attempting to influence belief sets.
Indeed, our whole political system presumes a "marketplace of ideas"
in which different views may be expressed in the hope of persuading
voters. Such activity, however, is identified as political, not scientific.
The rhetoric of science involves the notion that you do not have a
choice (e.g., what goes up, must come down). Thus, the treatment of
L&E as science - the injunction that you must do X because it
promotes market efficiency - amounts to a political judgment
masquerading as a scientific one.
As a factual matter, preferences change over time (and, indeed,
preferences may change because of the passage of time as, for
example, a person's appetite for savings might increase as one
approaches retirement age). Changes in the structure of our economic
and political institutions may cause changes in individual preference
orderings, both by altering costs of certain choices and by influencing
beliefs. An individual's past attempts to satisfy desires may,
themselves, influence the reordering of the current realizable set of
desires. Although economic models do not focus on explaining the
origin of desires (i.e., the wants of the individuals in the marketplace),
the policy recommendations made by legal economists will, if
implemented, in fact shape future preference orderings of the
realizable set of desires of the individual. 4 We may applaud an
individual's exercise of choice when the individual consciously makes
that choice with a view to shaping her future preferences for the
better; this is a form of character building advocated by Aristotle and
discussed by Elster, among others. The implementation of a policy
recommendation may have the same effect of shaping future
preferences; but, it will lack the laudatory element of choice if that
policy recommendation comes packaged as scientifically mandated,
rather than as a choice to be made. Thus, how the policy
recommendation is presented can adversely impact the exercise of
54. To be sure, this is a feature of all policy recommendations, not simply those
advocated by legal economists, because implementation of policy alters relative costs of
pursuing different actions. The critique aimed at L&E is aimed at the rhetoric used to
advance the policy and not at the simple fact that implementation of the policy will alter
preferences.
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freedom. This is my take on the most serious charge Professor
Schroeder makes against L&E.
IV. THINGS THAT Do NOT EXIST
Professor Schroeder expresses the hope that positive social
changes may be on the horizon, echoing the Hegelian faith in progress
through history. To understand how change in social structure is
possible, we need to consider some of its basic features. In reading
Lacan and related commentary, negative-existence claims abound:
"Woman" does not exist, the "Big Other" does not exist, etc.55 These
negative-existence claims often are claims about the structure of social
reality, but they typically are not explained in a manner that permits
understanding of what is at stake. We need this understanding so as to
evaluate Professor Schroeder's hope expressed at the end of Triumph
of Venus that a change for the better in the social order (the "Big
Other") may be just around the corner (p. 311). To understand how
positive social change is possible, one simply needs to recognize that
social reality is constructed through performative acts. Performative
acts create relationships by virtue of verbal behavior such as the
assertion "I do" in the marriage ceremony. In this sense we might
make the negative-existence claim that social facts "do not exist" or
are "unreal."
To be sure, social reality presents an ontological challenge. The
analytic philosophers clearly frame the problem.56 What does it mean
to say that "Jack and Jill are married?" When we ask such a question
we are asking for an account of the metaphysical status of social and
legal facts. We believe that statements expressed by sentences such as
this can be true or false, yet the truth conditions for such statements
differ from truth conditions for statements expressed by sentences
such as "The cat is on the mat." In the latter case, the sentence
expresses a brute fact.57 The truth or falsity of this statement can be
55. P. 306; see also VERHAEGHE, supra note 8, and almost any work by Slavoj Zilek,
see, e.g., SLAVOJ 2IZEK, ENJOY YOUR SYMPTOM!: JACQUES LACAN IN HOLLYWOOD AND
OUT 58-9 (rev. ed. 2001).
56. My account is based primarily on the work of J. L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS
WITH WORDS (1962), and JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY
(1995).
57. I expect a Lacanian initially might strongly disagree with my use of a
correspondence theory of truth. "[For Lacan, t]he world about which we speak and in which
we live is no 'brute' reality; it is itself already mediated and structured by the signifiers of
language, which allow it to appear as a meaningful and differentiated environment
(Umwelt)." VAN HAUTE, supra note 25, at 10-11. I use it here, however, for its illustrative
power. Indeed, in Professor Schroeder's view, the Lacanian Real, though not the natural
world, "includes our sense that there is a natural world external to our thoughts and dreams,
something more permanent than our fleeting human lives." Schroeder, End of Market, supra
note 20, at 500.
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ascertained by looking at the world. In the case of the marriage,
however, we assert a social fact and no amount of looking at the
present state of the world will help us. The truth or falsity of a present-
tense statement asserting a brute fact does not depend on the
occurrence of a past ceremony. Rather, its truth consists in a
correspondence between the statement and the state of the world. 8 In
contrast, the truth or falsity of the present-tense statement asserting a
social fact depends both on the present state of the world and on the
successful performance of a ceremony at some past time. The
ceremony, as an event with a beginning, a middle and an end, has
come and gone - it no longer exists, and its very existence in the past
was merely performative. Nevertheless, people take actions based on
the "existence" of social facts to the same extent that they would open
a door before attempting to walk through it.
Though I hope we can understand the above sense in which social
facts are "unreal," there is another sense in which various objects and
concepts do not exist in the Lacanian system. For Lacan, the "Real" is
that which escapes language and symbolization. It stands for that
aspect of the truth that remains unspoken - that which escapes
symbolization. In the abstraction of modeling, many aspects of reality
escape symbolization. For Lacan, the realm of law, language, and
symbolization is theorized as "masculine" whereas that aspect of truth
that remains unsymbolized is theorized as "feminine." The famous
Lacanian notion that "Woman does not exist" is merely a statement
that the feminine always escapes symbolization - for that which is
symbolized is, by definition, masculine. "Woman" does not exist in the
58. I do not expect to sell critical theorists or anyone else on a correspondence theory of
truth in this essay nor do I want to enter the debate over whether the nature of the
correspondence consists of something like the structure of the sentence "picturing" a portion
of the world a la Wittgenstein's inquiries or speculate on whether the relationship is
fundamental in the sense of Plato's doctrine of "participation." I do want to suggest that
such a theory accords with our common-sense manner of speaking and thinking and that the
contrast between brute and social facts has explanatory utility. Even within analytic
philosophy, serious debates exist over whether a rigorous concept of truth can ever be
expressed outside a purely formal language. Compare Alfred Tarski, The Concept of Truth
in Formalized Languages, in LOGIC, SEMANTICS, META-MATHEMATICS 152 (J. H. Woodger
trans., Hackett 2d ed. 1983) (arguing that formalization of truth as satisfaction by
correspondence between sentences and "reality" can only occur within the confines of a
formal model), with Richard Montague, English as a Formal Language, in FORMAL
PHILOSOPHY, SELECTED PAPERS OF RICHARD MONTAGUE 188 (Richard H. Thomason ed.,
2d ed. 1976) (suggesting that English may be formalized using set-theoretic semantics by
providing a set-theoretic model of a fragment of English). Similarly, I accept that even the
expression of a brute fact requires the use of language with whatever limitations accompany
use of language. This does not, however, lead me to toss either common sense or science out
the window as arbitrary or culturally relative in the way that the construction of social facts
is relative. See generally RONALD N. GIERE, SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS (1999); NORMAN
LEVITT, PROMETHEUS BEDEVILED (1998) (arguing against notions of scientific relativism).
As the philosopher Ian Hacking wryly notes, there is little point in writing about the social
construction of the Federal Reserve Bank because it so obviously is a social construction.
IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 13 (1999).
1442 [Vol. 102:1423
Spectres of Law & Economics
symbolic order precisely because the feminine (or at least a portion of
the feminine) is not part of the symbolic order.
How do we reconcile these two very different ideas of "does not
exist" in order to understand how society might be poised at a
moment in history in which things might change for the better?
Particularly, we need to understand the possibility of progress if the
Lacanian Real is part of a human psychical structure that does not
change.
Possible reconciliation comes from the simple recognition of the
way in which social reality is constructed as outlined above. To express
hope that things may improve, all Schroeder needs to do is
acknowledge that performative acts, such as ceremonies, construct
social facts. As the forms of ceremonies, as well as their aims, are
contingent and malleable the possibility for change comes from
education - the provision of information to persons as belief sets
undergo change. Changing the parameters of ceremonies can alter
contingent social structures and thereby promote human freedom in
ways that physical laws determining brute facts may not be altered.
Such changes can occur even if the structure of our mental life does
not change. This, I take it, is the basis for Professor Schroeder's
optimism expressed at the end of Triumph of Venus.
Nevertheless, one implication is that if the symbolic order were to change
in some fundamental sense, then our sexuality would necessarily also
change - and vice versa. If men could, in fact, define their subjectivity
otherwise than as superiority over an abjected femininity, if women
could define their femininity rather than implicitly accepting their
definition by men, and if the two sexes could recognize each other as
truly equal albeit different, then the very definition of sexual identity
would change. This has not yet happened, but, at least for an increasingly
large segment of society, it is considered appropriate. (p. 311)
Thus, Professor Schroeder rejects the notion that Lacanian theory
requires the subjection of women in the symbolic order to permit
creation of masculine subjectivity. This does not mean, however, that
change can be accomplished through merely willing such change to
occur. Instead, a collective change in intention must occur and that
change must be in the law and other symbolic structures of social
reality.
V. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
On reading Triumph of Venus I am left feeling as though I gained
some valuable methodological insights but that, nevertheless,
Professor Schroeder's project is, as of now, incomplete. Some progress
is evident: there are some traditional economists already worrying
about some of the problems Professor Schroeder identifies and at least
some legal economists are finally paying lip service to methodological
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concerns that trend in the direction of the return to Coase that
Schroeder advocates. I, too, support study of actual markets as a
precursor to policy recommendations. That said, the incompleteness
of Schroeder's work may stem from a lack of examples indicating how
use of economic analysis of law might be helpful or harmful (in
addition to the harm caused by masquerading as science). I offer two
examples, both tentative and potentially controversial, to frame
Schroeder's position. I find such an application of theory to concrete
situations needed for more complete understanding.
Certainly one positive fallout from the L&E movement's focus on
economic analysis might be its role in the demotion of the importance
of antitrust law. During the 1970's, in particular, the government
focused much regulatory effort on policy aimed at close management
of the economy. That effort has receded and we appear to be no worse
off (and many would suggest we are better off) for this development.59
One might see the fading of the importance of antitrust law as the
result of a methodological reflection prompted by L&E that led to
greater modesty about what government policy can and cannot
successfully achieve. The problems caused by unreflective confidence
in the adequacy of results obtained from application of L&E
methodology come not from such limiting results but rather from
positive policy recommendations that do not differ in kind from the
very ideal of management of the economy enshrined in antitrust law
that the L&E movement, in its early days, helped to counteract.
A current, positive example of an appropriate return to Coase
might be the approach of the economist, Hernando de Soto. De Soto
conducted an exhaustive empirical study of the land registration
systems in third-world countries. He identified the tremendous cost
and inefficiency confronting those who would register their property
interests as an obstacle that prevents full utilization of assets. In his
analysis, unregistered land operates as "dead" capital, unable to
function as collateral for economic expansion. The solution de Soto
identified is to streamline the property-registration process so that
those in the third world may convert dead capital to live capital by
registering their property interests to be recognized and protected by
the state.' His recommendations are, in scope, modest and follow
59. Some commentators not wedded to the laissez-faire L&E tradition have begun to
argue that we should reinvigorate, not abandon, antitrust doctrine. See, e.g., Reza Dibadj,
Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745 (2004) (arguing that traditional L&E has
misinterpreted the intent of antitrust law and proposing a reinvigorated competition law).
60. De Soto presents his study in HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL:
WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000). Some
third-world countries have listened to de Soto and preliminary indications are positive. See
Kerry A. Dolan, A New Kind of Entitlement, FORBES, Dec. 23, 2002, at 320. De Soto's
approach, however, is not without its critics. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Global Markets,
Racial Spaces and the Role of Critical Race Theory in the Struggle for Community Control of
Investments: An Institutional Class Analysis, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1037 (2000).
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from empirical study of actual markets. The approach is incremental
- it does not require adoption of a sweeping ideology or radical
change telling people how to run their lives. Rather, the change is
technical in nature and allows individuals to reap the benefits of an
existing property regime at lower cost.
In addition to concrete illustrations, I would like to see some
analysis of the types of social structures that promote (or at least are
compatible with) the well-being of individuals. In the absence of such
an analysis, I am unable to share Professor Schroeder's optimism that
a positive societal paradigm shift is about to occur. Indeed, though the
structure of various social realities is contingent (and thus subject to
modification) in ways that the reality explored by hard sciences is not,
this does not mean that social structures are easy to change. The best
metaphor I have seen for characterizing social reality is its comparison
to "magma," indicating both that it is a layered hierarchy, as theorized
by the philosopher John Searle, but also relatively intractable.6' As
indicated above, one avenue that might be developed from a Hegelian
perspective would be to further define the characteristics of the state
needed to promote human freedom and flourishing beyond facilitation
of market exchanges. Ultimately, I believe projects of this sort must
end with politics, a direction that Professor Schroeder is unwilling to
travel.
Policymakers face the task of making decisions with or without
analysis informed by economic thinking. I, for one, would rather have
the policymakers armed with economic analysis than nothing. The
caveat is that such information should not be relied upon to the
exclusion of other possibly relevant considerations. We need,
however, at least a hint of what those other legitimate considerations
might be. Notwithstanding silence on this point, Triumph of Venus
provides a valuable reminder that policy recommendations typically
are not matters of fact but matters of choice. To the extent a particular
rhetoric claims otherwise, the chances are good that an attempt is
afoot to limit freedom by denying choice.
61. See CORNELIUS CASTORIADUS, THE IMAGINARY INSTITUTION OF SOCIETY 182
(Kathleen Blarney trans., MIT Press 1987).
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